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 In Kant’s normative system, there are two types of moral law: ‘laws of freedom are 
called moral laws. As directed merely to external actions and their conformity to law they are 
juridical laws; but if they also require that they (the laws) themselves be the determining 
grounds of actions, they are ethical laws’ (6:214).2 Kant also writes: ‘For us, whose choice is 
sensibly affected and so does not of itself conform to the pure will but often opposes it, moral 
laws are imperatives (commands or prohibitions) and indeed categorical (unconditional) 
imperatives’ (6:221). I understand Kant to mean that moral laws are, by definition, 
unconditional practical laws, which are therefore categorical imperatives for imperfectly 
rational beings like us.3 This raises a question: how it can be the case that a juridical law is a 
categorical imperative? How can a statute passed by a legislative body generate an 
unconditional rational requirement for us to obey? 
 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that juridical laws4 enacted by legislators 
are categorical imperatives, and that the external incentives that the state links to its legal 
commands play a critical role in making them so. I will argue that statutory commands must 
be categorical imperatives if they are to establish juridical laws, and that statutes that fail to 
establish juridical laws do not obligate us to obey their terms. My account depends on the 
deep structural similarity that Kant perceived between ethical law and juridical law. Careful 
attention to the Kantian concepts of a law and of an imperative will make this similarity 
apparent, so I will begin by reviewing them. 
 
Next, I will describe Marcus Willaschek’s ‘paradox’ — his claim that juridical laws 
cannot be categorical imperatives for us even though it appears that they must be — and 
some of the reasoning that supports it. I will then attempt to rebut Willaschek by offering my 
own account of how juridical laws can be categorical imperatives. Finally, I will demonstrate 
the plausibility of my proposed account by showing that it illuminates related, previously 
opaque passages in The Doctrine of Right. 
  
The Concept of a Law and the Concept of an Imperative 
 
 A law in general is a necessary relation between objects. Kant identifies at least three 
different kinds of law, which feature different kinds of necessity and relate different kinds of 
objects to each other: laws (or principles) of logic, laws of nature, and moral laws.5 Principles 
of logic are ‘the universal rules of thinking in general’ (4:387). These rules relate concepts by 
means of conceptual containment.6 Laws of nature relate events or states of affairs through 
causal necessity: ‘the natural law of appearances in their relations to one another, namely the 
law of causality’ (5:29).7 Finally, moral laws relate agents (understood as rational beings) to 
acts or omissions by means of practical necessity.8 Although Kant usually uses the word 
‘law’ to refer to this kind of relation, he also sometimes uses it to refer to what he elsewhere 
calls the ‘content’ or ‘matter’ of the law: the legal command. I will specify how I understand 
him to be using the word in each relevant case. 
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 An imperative is ‘a practical rule by which an action in itself contingent is made 
necessary’ (6:222). A rule of this type ‘is indicated by an “ought,” which expresses objective 
necessitation to the action’ (5:20). Imperatives may be either hypothetical or categorical, 
depending on whether the necessitation they express is conditional or unconditional. A 
hypothetical imperative expresses a relation between an agent and an action that is necessary 
to bring about some chosen, contingent end. Such imperatives, Kant writes, are ‘practical 
precepts but not laws’ since (whilst they presuppose a relationship of natural causal necessity 
between means and ends) they do not assert a relationship of true practical necessity between 
an agent and an act — an agent can rationally respond to the precept by abandoning her 
contingent end as an alternative to doing the prescribed action (5:20). By contrast, a 
categorical imperative ‘alone brings with it that necessity that we require of a law’ because its 
‘unconditional command leaves the will no discretion’ (4:420).  
 
The concept of a categorical imperative is so similar to the concept of a moral law 
that Kant himself frequently seems to suggest that the two are identical. For example: ‘moral 
laws are imperatives (commands or prohibitions) and indeed categorical (unconditional) 
imperatives’ (6:221). However, at times Kant identifies two features that distinguish these 
two ideas. First, categorical imperatives express ‘necessitation’ rather than simply necessity 
(4:413). Kant uses this different terminology to reflect the empirical uncertainty that arises 
because imperatives are addressed to imperfectly rational beings: those capable of acting 
rationally but also capable of deviating from the requirements of reason. Second, Kant 
indicates that imperatives are, strictly speaking, representations of practical principles (be 
they precepts or laws) rather than precepts or laws themselves.9 For example: ‘The 
representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is necessitating for a will, is called a 
command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative’ (4:413). We 
act in accordance with our representations of laws rather than in accordance with laws 
themselves because we act under the idea of freedom: our representation of a practical law is 
the activity of self-legislation. 
 
Finally, Kant has at times specified a relationship of conceptual containment other 
than identity between a moral law and a categorical imperative. For example, ‘a (morally 
practical) law is a proposition that contains a categorical imperative (a command)’ (6:227). A 
categorical imperative might therefore be thought of as the aspect of a moral law that is 
visible to us from our perspective as imperfectly rational beings. 
 
Two Types of Moral Law 
 
 Kant identifies two types of moral law: ethical and juridical (6:214). Any ‘lawgiving’ 
(which I take to be the activity of generating a law) for either type of moral law shares a basic 
two-part structure: ‘first, a law, which represents an action to be done as objectively 
necessary, that is, which makes the action a duty; and second, an incentive, which connects a 
ground for determining choice to this action subjectively with the representation of the law’ 
(6:218). I understand Kant to be using the word ‘law’ here to refer to the ‘matter’ of the law: 
the content of the legal command.10 
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FIGURE 1 Two Types of Moral Law 
 
 
Although structurally similar, juridical laws differ from ethical laws in four important 
ways. First, ‘the author of [a juridical] law’ is not necessarily11 the same agent as ‘the author 
of the obligation in accordance with the law’ (6:227). I have argued elsewhere that Kant is 
referring to the omnilateral will as the author of the obligation in accordance with a juridical 
law, while the ‘author of the law’ — the supplier of the content of the legal command — is 
the legislative body of the state (for example, the UK Parliament).12 With respect to ethical 
laws, by contrast, an individual agent is the author of both the content of the legal command 
and the obligation to act in accordance with it. 
 
 Secondly, ethical and juridical lawgivings provide different kinds of incentives. In the 
Doctrine of Right, Kant states succinctly that ethical lawgiving makes the idea of duty itself 
the incentive (6:219). In the Second Critique, Kant explains in somewhat more detail how the 
idea of duty can connect the law subjectively with a determining ground of the will: 
reflecting on the concept of duty — the idea of an unconditional rational requirement to 
which we must submit ourselves — gives rise to a feeling called ‘respect’, which is the 
product of pure reason and yet also subjective (5:74). By contrast, juridical lawgiving ‘does 
not include the incentive of duty in the law and so admits an incentive other than the idea of 
duty itself’ (6:219).13 A juridical law ‘still needs an incentive suited to the law’ but ‘can 
connect only external incentives with it’ (6:219). The external incentive provided by the 
juridical law ‘must be drawn from the pathological determining grounds of choice, 
inclinations and aversions’ (6:219). By ‘pathological’, Kant generally means ‘dependent 
upon sensibility’ (5:20). Insofar as inclinations and aversions determine our choices, they are 
pathological determining grounds because they appeal to our sensible nature rather than to 
our rational nature (6:219). 
 
Thirdly, ‘[t]he freedom to which [juridical] laws refer can be only freedom in the 
external use of choice’ (6:214). I take Kant to mean that juridical laws can establish only our 
external freedom, understood as ‘independence from being constrained by another’s choice’ 
(6:237). By contrast, our internal freedom is established by ethical laws, which ‘cannot be 
subject to external lawgiving simply because they have to do with an end which (or the 
having of which) is also a duty’ (6:239). Kant identifies our external freedom as ‘the 
principle and the basis for any exercise of coercion’ (6:340). The subject matter of the 
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juridical law is thus limited to ‘the external and indeed practical relation of one person to 
another’ (6:230). 
 
The fourth difference between juridical and ethical laws ‘follows from’ the above 
observations about the nature of external freedom: ‘it cannot be required that this principle of 
all maxims [i.e. the Universal Principle of Right] be itself in turn my maxim, that is, it cannot 
be required that I make it the maxim of my action; for anyone can be free so long as I do not 
impair his freedom by my external action, even though I am quite indifferent to his freedom 
and would like in my heart to infringe upon it’ (6:231). Therefore, juridical laws are ‘directed 
merely to external actions and their conformity to law’, unlike ethical laws, which ‘also 
require that they (the laws) themselves be the determining grounds of actions’ (6:214). 
Juridical laws cannot demand anything more than external compliance because they are 
justified solely by the idea of external freedom, which requires nothing more. 
 
To summarize, a juridical law is distinct from an ethical law in the following ways: 1) 
its content (that is, ‘matter’) can be supplied by an entity that exercises the state’s legislative 
authority; 2) the incentive provided by a juridical lawgiving is external and ‘pathological’; 3) 
it is justified exclusively on the basis that it establishes our external freedom (as opposed to 
our internal freedom); and 4) a juridical law therefore commands only external conformity — 
a juridical law is never violated simply because it is complied with on the basis of morally 
indifferent or even immoral maxim. 
 
Willaschek’s Paradox 
 
 Scholars have wondered how juridical laws, given that they have the four distinctive 
properties listed above, could possibly be categorical imperatives. Marcus Willaschek calls 
this a ‘paradox’. It seems as though juridical laws must be categorical imperatives since they 
are supposed to unconditionally obligate us, and yet the features that Kant attributes to 
juridical laws seem to make that impossible.14 Willaschek argues that all categorical 
imperatives demand that they be followed for their own sake (i.e. out of respect for law), and 
we know that juridical laws don’t have this property since Kant explicitly states that juridical 
laws ‘do not expect, much less demand’ compliance from the motive of duty (6:231). 
Willaschek also suggests that threatened punishments cannot move us unconditionally 
because they move ‘only those who in fact want to avoid (the risk of) coercion and 
punishment’ to obey.15 This suggestion implies that there is nothing about coercion or 
punishment that we are unconditionally rationally required to avoid 
 
 Willaschek concludes that although his paradox cannot be resolved, it can be ‘tamed’: 
‘I suggest we understand Kant as saying that juridical laws indeed are prescriptive, but only 
when considered from the ethical perspective.’16 From this perspective, Willaschek suggests, 
‘people ask for normatively binding reasons to obey a given law, and, if the law indeed is 
unconditionally valid (is binding irrespective of prudential reasons), then there is such a 
reason to obey the law—which, because of the unconditional validity, is a reason to obey it 
for its own sake.’17 I will address Willaschek’s arguments in reverse order. 
 
Willaschek’s Paradox Must Be Dissolved, Not Tamed 
 
Willaschek proposes that we can tame his paradox by seeking ‘normatively binding 
reasons to obey a given law’. He reasons that ‘if the law indeed is unconditionally 
valid…then there is such a reason to obey the law — which, because of the unconditional 
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validity, is a reason to obey it for its own sake.’18 Willaschek does not specify the kinds of 
reasons that he thinks would reveal a statutory command that cannot be represented as a 
categorical imperative to nonetheless be unconditionally valid. It seems to me, though, that 
this approach cannot tame Willaschek’s paradox because, as I will show, a juridical 
lawgiving must be capable of moving us to obey unconditionally. A statute that cannot move 
us to obey unconditionally (that is, regardless of our inclinations) lacks universality, and thus 
it cannot be respected as law. 
 
The way in which a juridical law must be universal is revealed by Kant’s discussion 
of the role that ‘equal assurance’ plays in establishing our legal obligations (6:307). Such 
assurance is ‘contained in the concept of an obligation corresponding to an external right’ 
(6:256). For example, ‘No one is bound to refrain from encroaching on what another 
possesses if the other gives him no equal assurance that he will observe the same restraint 
towards him’ (6:307).19 Kant elsewhere writes, ‘I am…not under obligation to leave external 
objects belonging to others untouched unless everyone else provides me assurance that he 
will behave in accordance with the same principle’ (6:255-56). This assurance can only be 
provided ‘under a general external (i.e. public) lawgiving accompanied with power’ (6:256). 
Kant uses the word ‘power’ in the context of state action to refer to the executive authority to 
‘exercise coercion’.20 I therefore understand Kant to be claiming that the state’s coercive 
power must accompany any external lawgiving to provide us all with equal assurance of each 
other’s compliance, without which we do not have legal obligations. 
 
Moreover, Kant’s language indicates that that this coercive assurance ‘constrains’ our 
conduct prospectively (6:219). For example, ‘no one is bound to refrain from encroaching’ on 
what others possess if others give no ‘equal assurance’ that they will ‘observe the same 
restraint’ (6:307). In other words, assurance is not merely insurance (for example, a civil 
recompense after a wrong has been done). Rather, it functions as a deterrent, and it must, in 
some sense, serve this function for us all equally.21 
 
Why does Kant seem to think that a coercive deterrent is a prerequisite for legal 
obligation? My answer is that a juridical law must be universal in the sense that it is capable 
of moving us all to obey regardless of our subjective preferences. By contrast, a statutory 
command that can determine the wills of some but not all subjects (that is, one that can be 
represented only as a hypothetical imperative) cannot provide equal assurance, and thus it 
cannot obligate us. Nothing can empirically guarantee that imperfectly rational beings like us 
will obey the terms of a statute, of course, just as nothing can guarantee that we will always 
obey ethical laws. But a juridical lawgiving, just like an ethical one, must give us all a good 
reason to obey, because anything less would not provide ‘equal’ assurance in any sense of 
that word.22 I will later argue that a coercive deterrent can provide such a reason. 
 
If a statute that cannot move us all to obey fails to provide equal assurance and 
therefore lacks the universality of a law, then it cannot inspire ‘respect’ within us, which is, 
by definition, a rational being’s subjective response to the universal form of law. 
Willaschek’s paradox—that juridical laws cannot be categorical imperatives even though it 
seems they must be—cannot be tamed. It must instead be dissolved by an alternative account 
of the nature of juridical laws according to which they can be categorical imperatives for us 
— an account that does not depend on the ethical incentive of respect for law as such.  
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Juridical Laws as Categorical Imperatives 
 
On my proposed account, statutory commands succeed in establishing juridical laws 
if they are capable of being represented both as hypothetical and as categorical imperatives. I 
will show that a statute that threatens a punishment for disobedience can be represented in 
both of these ways.23 Kant’s own comments suggest that to qualify as a ‘punishment’, a legal 
consequence imposed in response to a crime must have three closely-related features. It must 
be 1) physical, 2) a pathological aversion and 3) incompatible with the external freedom of 
the person punished. I will argue that this third feature of punishment enables us to represent 
juridical laws as categorical imperatives. 
 
 First, a punishment ‘must be drawn from pathological determining grounds of choice, 
inclinations and aversions, and among these, from aversions; for it is a lawgiving, which 
constrains, not an allurement, which invites’ (6:219). In the Second Critique, Kant describes 
punishment as a ‘physical harm’ and also as a ‘physical consequence’ imposed on a convict 
(5:37).24 A punishment therefore cannot be an admonishment or condemnation. In the same 
discussion, Kant states that every crime ‘is of itself punishable — that is, forfeits happiness 
(at least in part)’, which is consistent with Kant’s claim that an external incentive provided by 
a juridical lawgiving must be contrary to our natural inclinations (since ‘happiness’ is the 
abstract unity of all such inclinations) (6:537).25 So far, it appears that punishments enable us 
to represent statutory commands as hypothetical imperatives by connecting the juridical law 
subjectively to the ‘pathological determining grounds of choice’. 
 
However, this is not the only way in which a punishment affects a convict. 
Punishment has a more abstract significance also: a convict is ‘someone who has lost [his 
dignity as a citizen] by his own crime, because of which, though he is kept alive, he is made a 
mere tool of another’s choice (either of the state or of another citizen). Whoever is another’s 
tool (which he can become only by a verdict and right) is a bondsman…and is the property of 
another, who is accordingly not merely his master but also his owner’ (6:329-30). These 
words offend modern sensibilities and could create the impression that Kant’s conception of 
punishment is inconsistent with respect for the humanity of convicts. 
 
In context, however, Kant’s words reveal that he conceives of punishment as 
treatment incompatible with the external freedom of convicts, rather than with their 
unconditional moral worth.26 Recall that external freedom is ‘independence from being 
constrained by another’s choice’ (6:237). To say that a convict becomes ‘another’s tool’ is 
just exactly to say that she becomes externally unfree due to her crime. A convict’s external 
un-freedom amounts to the loss of her ‘dignity as a citizen’, although nothing can strip a 
person of her inner dignity as a being with unconditional moral worth.27 
 
Kant’s examples of punishments that have the above-described features. First, a 
person guilty of slander may be ‘constrained by judgment and right not only to apologize 
publicly to the one he has insulted but also to kiss his hand’ (6:332). This punishment 
involves literally being made a ‘tool of another’s choice’, performing an act averse to his 
natural pride, presumably backed by the threat of another deprivation of freedom 
(imprisonment, perhaps) if he disobeys. Other examples of punishment, ‘convict or prison 
labor’ and ‘solitary confinement involving hardship’, deprive convicts of external freedom of 
action, movement and/or association (6:332-33). 
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Willaschek argues that punishments can move ‘only those who in fact want to avoid 
(the risk of) coercion and punishment’.28 He is certainly right that we are able to represent 
statutes that authorize such punishments as hypothetical imperatives. As aversions, 
threatened punishments can connect legal commands subjectively to the determining grounds 
of our sensible impulses. Most of us would find most criminal penalties very unpleasant, so 
the resulting hypothetical imperatives can inspire a great deal of compliance, but they cannot 
do so universally. 
 
Because punishment is also a state of external un-freedom, though, it is something we 
are required by reason alone to avoid, regardless of our individual inclinations (assuming that 
remaining externally free is our alternative) because our external freedom is an end that we 
are unconditionally rationally required to have. We can only be externally free in a rightful 
condition, which is why ‘reason, by a categorical imperative, makes [a rightful condition] 
obligatory to strive for’ (6:318). This premise is Kant’s sole justification for state authority: 
we must regard the state as holding the legislative, executive and juridical authorities, 
because only in the context of a civil condition can we regard ourselves as externally free 
under laws we give to ourselves. 
 
Our duty of ‘rightful honor’ is directly implied by the status of our external freedom 
as a necessary end for us: ‘Do not make yourself a mere means for others’ (6:236). I think 
Kant means that we are rationally required not to throw our external freedom away, thus 
becoming ‘a mere tool of another’s choice’ (6:237). Kant elucidates our duty of rightful 
honour as a premise in his argument that we are obligated to leave the state of nature, but 
readers should not be misled into thinking that we have this duty only in the absence of a 
functioning state. Kant’s ‘idea of the original contract’ is the conceptual, not historical, basis 
of state authority (6:319). A person who lives within the territory of an existing state ‘leaves 
the state of nature’ simply by meeting her obligations under public laws. In this context, I 
will argue that her duty of rightful honour does the same work that it would do in a state of 
nature: she is obligated to obey statutory commands in the first instance because her duty of 
rightful honour forbids her from throwing away her freedom by becoming legally liable to 
punishment, and thus no longer secure in her rights. This analysis makes sense of Kant’s 
claim that ‘it is impossible to will to be punished’ (6:335). Such a will would be in 
contradiction with itself, since punishment is the negation of external freedom, which we are 
rationally required not to throw away.29 
 
We can therefore represent a statute that links a legal command to a threatened 
punishment as a categorical imperative if it presents us with a choice between 1) doing what 
the law commands and being able to continue to regard ourselves as externally free under 
juridical laws that we give to ourselves via the omnilateral will, or 2) violating the legal 
command and becoming legally punishable. Being legally punishable is inconsistent with 
regarding ourselves as externally free even if we escape detection, because we lose the 
assurance we formally had that our rights will be respected, and such assurance is constitutive 
of any right for Kant. A threatened punishment can thus connect an otherwise just30 legal 
command subjectively with an unconditional ground of obligation, specifically our duty of 
rightful honour.31 Figure 2 
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Figure 2: Juridical Lawgivings Can be Represented in Two Ways 
 
 
Once a juridical law exists, our ability to represent it as a categorical imperative due 
to our apprehension of its universality, and therefore its law-like form, will give rise to the 
ethical incentive of ‘respect’ within us — reason’s subjective response to the form of law. 
This is how we can be moved to obey a juridical law from duty alone, and this explains how 
all of our juridical duties are ‘indirectly ethical’ as well (6:221). Kant describes this kind of 
mental leap in his discussion of the ‘Formula of Humanity’ in the Groundwork:  
 
[R]ational nature exists as an end in itself. The human being necessarily 
represents his own existence in this way; so far it is thus a subjective principle 
of human actions. But every other rational being also represents his existence 
in this way consequent on just the same rational ground that also holds for me; 
thus it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme 
practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will (4:428-29). 
 
Analogously, the reason a threatened punishment makes it the case that an agent is rationally 
required to do what an otherwise just statute commands is that she is rationally required to 
have her own external freedom (that is, freedom from being a mere means for others) as an 
end. This is essentially what Kant describes above as ‘a subjective principle of human 
actions’ and is therefore ‘a ground for determining choice’ that a threatened punishment can 
connect ‘subjectively with the representation of the law’ — exactly what a juridical lawgiving 
requires (6:218). Only if and when an agent makes the subsequent inference that ‘every other 
rational being also represents his existence in this way’ does she apprehend the universality 
of the juridical law and become able to obey the juridical law out of duty alone. 
 
Juridical Laws Do Not Command Us to Act from Duty 
 
One question remains: does my analysis imply that juridical laws themselves demand 
obedience from duty (that is, out of respect for law)? Willaschek argues that ‘the only way to 
obey a categorical imperative, as such, is to obey it for its own sake…But then, it seems, 
juridical laws cannot find expression in categorical imperatives, after all, because juridical 
laws do not require obedience for their own sake.’32 Willaschek clarifies that when he refers 
to obeying a categorical imperative ‘for its own sake’, he means ‘out of respect for law’.33 
Fortunately for my account, I think that Willaschek is mistaken to conclude that all 
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categorical imperatives necessarily command that they be obeyed out of respect for law. 
Willaschek’s mistake is to generalise from the example of the ethical principle, which does 
indeed command this, to all categorical imperatives. The command to ‘act only in accordance 
with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’ 
just means act lawfully (that is, from duty) (4:421). The command to act from duty is 
therefore the matter (that is, the content) of the ethical law. Because the Formula of Universal 
Law embodies the concept of a categorical imperative—an unconditional rational 
requirement—the ethical principle has a uniquely recursive structure. 
 
Figure 3: Kant’s Recursive Ethical Principle 
 
 
It does not follow that all categorical imperatives must have this recursive feature. On 
the contrary, Kant seems to specifically state that this is not a required feature of categorical 
imperatives as such: ‘ethical lawgiving includes within its law the internal incentive to the 
action (the idea of duty), and this feature must not be present in external lawgiving’ (6:219). I 
understand Kant’s words ‘within its law’ in this sentence to refer to the contents (i.e. matter) 
of the law: the legal command. 
 
A juridical lawgiving can and must generate a duty to do what the law commands, but 
the contents of that legal command need not include a requirement that we act from the idea 
of duty. The existence of a duty not to f does not logically entail that not f-ing itself involves 
acting on the basis of a particular incentive.34 For example, we can be obligated not to steal 
by a juridical law that commands, ‘do not steal’ without it being the case that that juridical 
command further stipulates that we must refrain from stealing out of duty. I do exactly what a 
juridical law prohibiting theft commands me to do if I do not steal because I think jail would 
be unpleasant (thus acting on my representation of the relevant statute as a hypothetical 
imperative), or even without being aware of the legal command at all, so long as I do not 
steal. In other words, juridical laws do not command obedience from duty; they command 
only external ‘conformity’, which we are under a duty to provide (6:214). If this reasoning is 
sound, then I have successfully dissolved Willaschek’s paradox by showing that a juridical 
law’s distinctively juridical features do not preclude its status as a categorical imperative. 
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Textual Puzzles Resolved 
 
 My proposed account is especially plausible because it can shed light on at least two 
additional discussions in the Doctrine of Right. First, Kant claims that ‘the law of punishment 
is a categorical imperative’ (6:331).35 He means that the person who holds the state’s 
executive authority (the ‘ruler’) is unconditionally rationally required to respond to a crime36 
by punishing the lawbreaker: ‘Punishment by a court…can never be inflicted merely as a 
means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society. It must 
always be inflicted upon him only because he has committed a crime’ (6:331). Kant further 
underscores the unconditionality of the duty to punish by condemning a grant of clemency as 
‘injustice in the highest degree’—a formally wrong action (6:337).37 Kant’s statement 
therefore implies that his concept of a rightful condition requires the state to punish all 
criminal wrongdoing.38 
 
 These discussions can be uncharitably read as expressions of vengefulness or anger 
toward criminals, but it seems more likely to me that punishment is a categorical imperative 
for the state’s executive officials because a threatened punishment is a constitutive part of 
any juridical lawgiving. Because a threatened punishment necessarily accompanies any 
obligatory legal command embodied in statute, the same juridical lawgiving that legally 
requires a subject to do what the law commands legally requires the ruler to punish those who 
do not. My account makes this reading appealing by explaining why threatened punishments 
are so critically important: they enable us to represent juridical laws enacted by legislators as 
categorical imperatives. Alternative accounts such as Willaschek’s are not directly 
inconsistent with Kant’s claims that punishments are essential to juridical lawmaking, but 
they do not explain why punishments are essential. 
 
 My thesis can also illuminate a second opaque analysis of Kant’s regarding the ill-
named ‘right of necessity’. Kant considers the case of a shipwrecked sailor ‘who, in order to 
save his own life, shoves another off a plank on which he had saved himself’ (6:235). The 
sailor’s act is wrong because it violates his victim’s innate right of humanity, which we all 
have even in the state of nature. However, Kant concludes that the homicidal sailor is 
‘unpunishable’ because ‘there can be no penal law that would assign the death penalty’ to 
someone in this situation (6:235). Kant reasons as follows: ‘A penal law of this sort could not 
have the effect intended, since a threat of an ill that is still uncertain (death by judicial 
verdict) cannot outweigh the fear of an ill that is certain (drowning). Hence the deed of 
saving one’s life by violence is not to be judged inculpable but only unpunishable, and by a 
strange confusion jurists take this subjective impunity to be objective impunity (conformity to 
law)’ (6:235-36). 
 
 If the thesis of this chapter is correct, a statute prohibiting murder cannot be 
represented as a categorical imperative by Kant’s sailor, because it does not present him with 
a choice between 1) doing what the law commands and being able to continue to regard 
himself as externally free under juridical laws that he gives himself via the omnilateral will, 
or 2) violating the legal command and becoming legally punishable, which is inconsistent 
with regarding himself as externally free. If the sailor does what the statute prohibiting 
murder commands under these circumstances, he will be dead, which will extinguish the 
possibility of his external freedom. By contrast, some possibility of external freedom remains 
for the sailor if he commits the homicide because he may be acquitted or offered clemency. 
Accordingly, in this situation the threatened punishment of death cannot connect the statutory 
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command ‘do not murder’ subjectively with the ground of this sailor’s duty of rightful 
honour. 
 
Kant describes the sailor’s legal situation as one of ‘subjective impunity’ because a 
juridical lawgiving must provide an external incentive that ‘connects a ground for 
determining choice to this action subjectively with the representation of the law’, and under 
the sailor’s circumstances it could not do so unconditionally (6:218).39 The sailor’s action is a 
juridical wrong because he violates his victim’s innate right, but since no juridical lawgiving 
obligated the sailor to refrain from doing what he did, no law authorises the state to punish 
him. In other words, he has violated the natural juridical law of innate right without violating 
any legislative enactment.40 Of course, the sailor could still preserve his internal freedom by 
respecting his companion’s innate right, and the ethical incentive of respect (that is, duty 
subjectively considered) could move him to act rightly.41 This same analysis would not apply 
to cases involving acquired rights of property, contract, or status because acquired rights do 
not exist in the absence of legislation that establishes and protects them, nor would it apply to 
public legal obligations such as the duty to pay taxes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I have argued that statutory commands must be capable of being represented as 
categorical imperatives by us if they are to legally obligate us, and that statutory commands 
must be linked to external incentives that are incompatible with our external freedom to be 
capable of being represented in this way. The statutes that I have demonstrated provide the 
required command/incentive combination are what Kant calls ‘penal laws’, or ‘criminal laws’ 
in current parlance. All juridical laws promulgated by legislators are indeed ‘criminal laws’, 
if by that term we simply mean the set of legal commands that we are obligated to obey by 
means of a threatened coercive response to wrongdoing that is inconsistent with our external 
freedom (that is, a ‘punishment’).42 Such laws do not need to be labelled ‘criminal’ or ‘penal’ 
by lawmakers in order to have the effect of obligating us to obey, but they do need to contain 
the constitutive elements of any juridical lawgiving. By contract, laws that establish civil 
remedies are essential in a rightful condition because they restore a rightful allocation of 
property, contract and status after a wrong has occurred, but constraining wrongdoing 
prospectively is neither their purpose nor their universal effect. It follows that legislative 
bodies ought to link otherwise just statutory commands to threatened punishments that are 
inconsistent with our external freedom, because only in this way can they establish our 
external freedom through obligatory laws that we give to ourselves.43 
1 I am grateful to Pablo Muchnik, Oliver Thorndike, Marcus Willaschek, and Allen W. Wood 
for valuable feedback on earlier drafts of this project. All errors remain my own. 
 
2 All quotations from Kant’s works are taken from Mary J. Gregor (trans. and ed.), The 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
 
3 Kant elsewhere indicates that unconditional necessity is a constitutive feature of any moral 
law. For example, he writes that ‘a law, if it is to hold morally, that is, as a ground of 
obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity’ (4:389). He also writes, ‘unless we want to 
deny the concept of morality any truth and any relation to some possible object…it must hold 
not only for human beings but for all rational beings as such, not merely under contingent 
conditions and with exceptions but with absolute necessity’ (4:408). 
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4 Kant acknowledges the existence of so-called ‘permissive laws’, which enable people to 
alter their rights and obligations without requiring them to do or refrain from doing anything. 
Because such enactments do not obligate us, they cannot be moral laws as Kant conceives of 
the latter. For brevity and consistency, I will use the term ‘juridical laws’ to refer only to 
what Kant elsewhere calls ‘[o]bligatory laws for which there can be external lawgiving’ 
(6:224). When I refer to permissive laws, I will say so explicitly. 
 
5 These types of law correspond to the ancient Greek division of sciences endorsed by Kant: 
logic, physics, and ethics (4:387). 
 
6 These are analytic propositions, a good example of which is: ‘Whoever wills the end also 
wills (insofar as reason has a decisive influence on his actions) the indispensably necessary 
means to it that are within his power’ (4:417). In this example, ‘the imperative extracts the 
concept of actions necessary to this end merely from the concept of a volition of this end’ 
(4:417). 
 
7 Elsewhere Kant writes, ‘Physical causality, or the condition under which it takes place, 
belongs among the concepts of nature’ (5:68). He also writes, ‘[T]he universality of law in 
accordance with which effects take place constitutes what is properly called nature in its most 
general sense’ (4:421). 
 
8 ‘A principle that makes certain actions duties is a practical law’ (6:225), and ‘duty and 
obligation are concepts that express the objective practical necessity of certain actions’ 
(6:224). 
 
9 Rational beings like ourselves do not act directly in accordance with laws as things in the 
natural world do, but instead act ‘in accordance with the representations of laws’ (4:412). 
 
10 This distinction is explained at (5:29). 
 
11 Some juridical laws, such as those establishing acquired rights, ‘may be recognized as 
obligatory a priori by reason even without external lawgiving’ and therefore do not require 
an external author to supply the matter of the law, although they do require external 
application and enforcement (i.e. the exercise of the judicial and executive authorities of the 
state). (6:224) These are ‘external but natural laws.’ (6:224) By contrast, ‘positive laws’ have 
contingent content and therefore require an external author to supply the matter of the law 
(6:224). Kant says elsewhere: ‘rights are divided into natural right, which rests only on a 
priori principles, and positive (statutory) right, which proceeds from the will of a legislator’ 
(6:237). 
 
12 See M. E. Newhouse, ‘The Legislative Authority’ 24(4) Kantian Review (2019). 
(forthcoming) 
 
13 I understand Kant to be saying that the matter (i.e. content) of a juridical law does not insist 
that we obey from duty. This does not entail that we have no duty to obey the juridical law or 
that our duty to obey cannot move us to obey. 
 
14 See generally Marcus Willaschek, ‘Which Imperatives for Right? On the Non-Prescriptive 
Character of Juridical Laws in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals’ in Mark Timmons (ed.), Kant’s 
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Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 65-
87. 
 
15 Willaschek, ‘Which Imperatives for Right?’, p. 71. Willaschek is surely correct that the 
prospect of pain or discomfort alone can establish only hypothetical imperatives for us. For 
example, the imperative that a young person ‘must work and save in his youth in order to not 
to want in his old age’ is merely hypothetical, since a person may think that ‘in case if future 
need he can make do with little.’ (5:20) 
 
16 Willaschek, ‘Which Imperatives for Right?’, p. 86. 
 
17 Willaschek, ‘Which Imperatives for Right?’, p. 86. 
 
18 Willaschek, ‘Which Imperatives for Right?’, p. 86. 
 
19 Kant’s example is taken from private right, but Kant nowhere suggests that assurance is not 
similarly required to establish a legal obligation corresponding to an external public right. 
 
20 Kant writes, ‘the executive power of the supreme ruler…is irresistible’ (6:316). He also 
writes that ‘the executive authority…has the supreme capacity to exercise coercion in 
conformity with the law’ (6:317). 
 
21 Kant’s requirement that assurance be equal seems to be implied by ‘innate equality’ – an 
‘authorization’ that Kant takes to be contained in the concept of external freedom: 
‘independence from being bound to others to more than one can in turn bind them’ (6:237-
38). 
 
22 Kant’s conception of obligation is ‘the necessity of a free action under a categorical 
imperative of reason’, and he emphasizes that this conception is ‘common to both parts of 
The Metaphysics of Morals’ (6:222). 
 
23 A rational being acts in accordance with the representations of laws rather than directly in 
accordance with laws because she acts under the idea of freedom, i.e. she has a will (4:412). 
If laws determined our conduct directly, as the laws of nature determine the behavior of 
things, we would be unable to experience our actions as free choices. Perfectly rational 
beings act in accordance with their representations of laws just as we do, but because 
perfectly rational beings always obey the law, their representations do not take the form of 
imperatives as ours do. As imperfectly rational beings, our representations have an 
imperative form because we are aware of our capacity to deviate from the requirements of 
reason (4:413). 
 
24 Kant also refers to punishment in this discussion as ‘mere harm’ in order to emphasize that 
the concept itself does not include any idea of an extrinsic benefit to the wrongdoer or to 
society (5:37). 
 
25 We are not rationally required to have any particular set of natural inclinations. I take Kant 
to be plausibly suggesting that humans overwhelmingly share certain natural inclinations due 
to our physical similarity, and that punishments must be averse to these. A person with a 
highly unusual set of inclinations (including masochism, perhaps), might be attracted rather 
than repelled by the hypothetical imperative generated by a threatened punishment, which is 
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one reason (though not the only one) why punishments must also generate categorical 
imperatives for us. 
 
26 Indeed, Kant elsewhere argues that legislators must ‘take into account respect for the 
humanity in the person of the wrongdoer (i.e. respect for the species)’ when they prescribe 
punishments (6:362-63). Kant concludes that certain crimes, such as rape, cannot be punished 
by treating the criminal as he has treated his victim, since the imposition of, for example, rape 
as a punishment would be a ‘crime against humanity as such’ (6:363). 
 
27 The concept of dignity is essentially the concept of pricelessness. Kant writes, ‘In this 
kingdom of ends, everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced 
by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all price and 
therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity.’ (4:434) When Kant refers to the ‘dignity of a 
citizen’, I understand him to be referring to the external freedom of a citizen, which makes 
him ‘beyond reproach’ under the law so long as he has done nothing wrong (6:238). This 
civil dignity that we enjoy is priceless in the sense that we cannot rationally choose to 
sacrifice it, which, I will argue, is what Kant means when he says that ‘it is impossible to will 
to be punished’ (6:335). 
 
28 Willaschek, ‘Which Imperatives for Right?’, p. 71. 
 
29 It is only because we can continue to see ourselves as free under just laws that we are 
required to obey the demands of rightful statutes. By contrast, my duty of rightful honor 
would not compel me to obey a robber who threatens to beat me if I do not turn over your 
wallet, because the robber would not be offering me a choice between freedom and un-
freedom. Instead, he is offering me a choice between two kinds of un-freedom, and I can 
rationally choose either to comply or to resist. 
 
30 The question of how an agent can represent a statute that makes an unjust demand — one 
that is inconsistent with our rightful freedom — is an important one for future research. The 
analysis of this chapter presupposes that the statutes in question are otherwise consistent with 
the requirements of justice. 
 
31 As Kant writes, ‘rational nature exists as an end in itself. The human being necessarily 
represents his own existence in this way; so far it is thus a subjective principle of human 
actions’ (4:428-29). 
 
32 Willaschek, ‘Which Imperatives for Right?’, p. 70. 
 
33 Willaschek, ‘Which Imperatives for Right?’, p. 71. 
 
34 As Kant writes, ‘Duty is that action to which someone is bound. It is therefore the matter of 
obligation, and there can be one and the same duty (as to the action) although we can be 
bound to it in different ways’ (6:222). I understand Kant to mean that the word ‘duty’ in this 
context refers to the action that it is a practical necessity for a person to undertake, that this 
action is specified in the ‘matter’ (i.e. content) of the legal command, and that we can be 
bound (i.e. obligated) to undertake this same action in different ways: both juridically and 
ethically. If Kant were to insist, as Willaschek does, that the action specified by the content of 
the legal command must include a particular incentive (e.g. respect for law as such), then 
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Kant’s conclusion that we can be bound to this action in multiple different ways (i.e. by 
means of different incentives) would not make sense. 
 
35 A few pages later, Kant refers to ‘the categorical imperative of penal justice’ (6:336). In 
the Second Critique, Kant mentions in passing that ‘punishment…would still have to be 
connected with [moral wickedness] as a consequence in accordance with principles of moral 
lawgiving’ (5:37). 
 
36 A crime is ‘a transgression of public law that makes someone who commits it unfit to be a 
citizen’ (6:331). Kant distinguishes between intentional wrongdoing within the privity of 
contract (‘private crime’), such as embezzlement, and public crimes such as counterfeiting, 
theft, and robbery, and he suggests that only the latter category require punishment (The 
former are brought before a ‘civil court’, presumably so that civil remedies may be imposed.) 
(6:331). This is no longer a recognized distinction in the common law, and I mention it only 
to note that I do not think it presents a problem for my argument. 
 
37 See M. E. Newhouse, ‘Two Types of Legal Wrongdoing’ Legal Theory 22 (2016), pp 59—
75, 63. 
 
38 Kant writes, ‘The rightful effect of what is culpable is punishment’ (6:227). 
 
39 A particular sailor might, of course, dread death by hanging far more than death by 
drowning, and might therefore be moved by the juridical law against murder on the basis of 
his representation of it as a hypothetical imperative. However, no statute could be represented 
as a categorical imperative for individuals in the sailor’s situation, which is what a juridical 
lawgiving, and therefore external legal obligation, requires. 
 
40 The command to leave the state of nature seems to be another natural juridical law in the 
sense that it is unconditionally binding without being externally legislated (6:237). The 
question of how such natural juridical laws can be categorical imperatives for us is 
tantamount to the extremely deep question of how right and ethics are related, and this 
chapter does not address this deeper question. I am grateful to Allen W. Wood for helpful 
comments. 
 
41 For a thought-provoking discussion of this issue, see Alice Pinheiro Walla, ‘When the 
Strictest Right is the Greatest Wrong: Kant on Fairness’, Estudos Kantianos, 3/1 (2015), 39–
56. 
 
42 ‘Punishment’ is just the label for the concept of a threatened legal response to wrongdoing 
that is incompatible with our external freedom. Any response to wrongdoing that is 
inconsistent with our external freedom can generate a legal obligation as part of a juridical 
lawgiving, regardless of how it is described by lawmakers. 
 
43 Only formal wrongs — those that are committed on the basis of bad maxims — require 
punishment, because punishment is supposed to constrain us to obey. Wrongs that are 
committed inadvertently (and therefore on the basis of innocent maxims) warrant civil 
damages but not punishment because they cannot be prospectively constrained. See 
Newhouse, ‘Two Types of Legal Wrongdoing’, p 73. Kant’s reference to a juridical incentive 
as an ‘external constraint’ is consistent with my interpretation: a ‘constraint’ prevents future 
actions; it does not remedy or unwind the effects of past actions (6:220). 
